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Family control is a widespread phenomenon throughout the world. As the family 
businesses booming, more and more studies show that there may be more serious 
conflict between shareholders and small shareholders in family businesses compared 
with other forms of companies. Additionally, the probability of looting small and 
medium shareholders is higher and the degree is deeper(Bebchuk et al., 1998; La 
Portra et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). Domestic and foreign scholars have studied 
the issue of listed family companies’ controlling shareholder occupying small and 
medium shareholders from multi-angle such as the company’s value, dividend policy 
and information disclosure, and the achievement is fruitful. However, the evidence for 
controlling shareholders’ invasion and occupation of interests of small shareholders 
from the perspective of earnings management is relatively lacking. The existing 
minority of literature investigating from the perspective of earnings management only 
focused on the testing of the impacts for control and cash flow rights on earnings 
management, they did not investigate the impact of the acquisition forms as well as 
the internal structure of family control on the earnings management， but also ignored 
the classification study on actual control of families.  
This paper, starting from the characteristics of the family control, more 
comprehensively studies its impact on the earnings management, in order to enrich the 
research on the family businesses. In addition, the paper also investigates in 
classification according to the different means of ultimate controller acquire control, 
hoping to provide more rational perspective for the study on characteristics of family 
control and earnings management.  
This paper uses the listed family companies for the period of 2004-2008 as the 
sample, and the line item divided by the total assets as a proxy for the magnitude of 
earnings management. It first studies the impact on earnings management for the 
means of listed family companies acquire their control, way of control realization, 
internal control structure, the proportion of cash flow rights as well as the 
characteristics of participation of family members. Empirical study shows that: (1) 
listed family companies that obtain control through backdoor listing have a stronger 














control and cash flow rights, the higher rate of earnings management; (3) as the level 
of control increases， earnings management gets greater; (4) the ownership of 
family’s actual controllers on cash flow has inhibitory effect on their earnings 
management; (5) the participation of family members has no significant impact on 
earnings management.  
Then, this paper investigates whether different types of control have different 
impact on earnings management in the various listed family companies. Empirical 
study shows that: (1) listed family companies by backdoor listing have a stronger 
incentive to build a complex level for earnings management, cash flow rights and the 
participation of family members have no significant effect on earnings management; 
(2) in the direct-listed family companies, cash flow rights have stronger inhibitory 
effect on earnings management, family members’ participation in corporate 
governance is conducive to the reduction of earnings management behavior, levels of 
control have no significant impact on earnings management. 
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发现，美国标准普尔 500 强中约 1/3 的公司长期被家族拥有，这些家族平均持有
近 19%的公司股份。La Porta et al.（1999）[3]通过从 27 个发达经济体中选取市值
最大的 20 家上市公司的样本中，约 64％的样本公司拥有终极控股股东，且约 30%










国有企业 14.3 万个，比 2004 年减少 3.6 万个，下降 20%；私营企业 359.6 万个，















年下降 8.1%；股份有限公司占 28.7%，比 2004 年增加 7.7%；私营企业占 12.3%，



























                                                        
①数据来源：中华人民共和国国家统计局网站。 
②根据家族上市公司样本数据整理。 


































































































































一、引  言 
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